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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
RICHARD RODRIGUEZ, : Case No. 940700-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), whereby a defendant in a 
district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of 
Appeals from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other 
than a first degree or capital felony. 
TEXT OF STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following rules, statutes and 
constitutional provisions are provided in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995) 
Utah Const, art. I, § 14 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court err in determining that the officer's 
seizure and search of Appellant did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment ? 
Standard of Review: This issue involves a question of 
law which is reviewed nondeferentially for correctness. In 
making that correctness review, however, an appellate court 
allows the trial judge a "measure of discretion . . . when 
applying that standard to a given set of facts." State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). The Pena court did not clarify 
the precise measure of discretion to be afforded the trial court. 
Instead, it stated: 
Precisely how much discretion we cannot say, but 
we would not anticipate a close, de novo review. 
On the other hand, a sufficiently careful review 
is necessary to assure that the purposes of the 
reasonable-suspicion requirement are served, 
[footnote omitted]. 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 939. 
In the present case, the parties agreed to submit the 
transcript of the preliminary hearing to the trial judge as the 
evidentiary basis for her ruling on the motion to suppress. 
R. 56. Although Pena requires that a measure of discretion must 
be afforded the trial judge, in this case where the trial judge 
made finding^ after reviewing a transcript rather than live 
testimony, such discretion should be minimal and the review by 
this Court closer to a de novo review. 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
On September 21, 1994, Appellant moved the district court 
to suppress the drug evidence on the grounds that the arresting 
officer had violated Appellant's rights to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
2 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The court denied 
Appellant's motion to suppress. R. 16, 53-91. Appellant 
thereafter entered a conditional plea of guilty pursuant to State 
v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), on September 26, 1994. 
R. 18-20, 93-107. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal with 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County on November 
9, 1994. R. 33-4. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for 
Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) & 
(b) (1953 as amended), and Possession of a Controlled Substance, 
a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(1) (e) (1953 as amended). Appellant moved the court to 
suppress the cocaine and marijuana on the grounds that the 
arresting officers had violated his right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. R. 53-92. The court denied 
Appellant's motion on September 21, 1994. R. 16.1 Appellant 
entered his conditional plea of guilty on September 26, 1994. 
R. 18-20, 94-106. The trial court sentenced Appellant on 
1
 The trial judge reviewed a portion of the preliminary 
hearing transcript as the basis for her ruling. A copy of the 
preliminary hearing transcript (PHT. 1-20) is contained in 
Addendum B. 
3 
October 31, 1994 to one year in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
R. 31-2. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 27, 1994, at approximately 6:53 p.m., Salt Lake 
City Police officer Kenneth Dailey ("Officer Dailey") was 
patrolling the Pioneer Park area on his motorcycle. PHT. 2. The 
patrol was part of what he termed an "informal" effort to "clean 
up the area." PHT. 8. According to Officer Dailey, the Pioneer 
Park area is well known for drug trafficking. PHT. 2, 8. 
As Officer Dailey turned from 200 South heading north on 
500 West, he saw two men about one-half block away on the west 
sidewalk of 500 West. PHT. 9. The two men were facing each 
other and were facing away from Officer Dailey. PHT. 9-10. They 
appeared to be talking to one another. PHT. 10, 17. Richard 
Rodriguez ("Rodriguez" or "Appellant") was straddling his bicycle 
with his feet on the ground. PHT. 9-10, 12. The other 
individual, according to Officer Dailey, "was dressed different 
from the usual person we're seeing in that area." He had on a 
golf shirt, shorts and tennis shoes. PHT. 5. 
As Officer Dailey got closer to the two, he saw the man 
in the shorts pull something green out of his pocket. Officer 
Dailey "felt it was money" because "it was green" and "[i]t was 
like a wad and it looked like money." PHT. 10. The man in 
shorts put the money back in his pocket when Officer Dailey was 
within about 25 feet. PHT. 3. Officer Dailey testified that he 
4 
had no idea of the relationship between the two individuals on 
the sidewalk when he first saw them, that Appellant made no 
attempt to reach out or take the money from the other individual, 
and that Appellant did not do anything that was in violation of 
the law. PHT. 11-12. Officer Dailey acknowledged that at that 
point he had only a "hunch" that something was going on. 
PHT. 17. 
As the two individuals began to separate, Office Dailey 
ordered them to stop. PHT. 3. Officer Dailey told Rodriguez and 
the other man that the police were having a problem with drug 
activity in the area, that he felt like there was a drug 
transaction going on, and that they were to wait until another 
officer arrived. PHT. 3, 11. At that point, according to 
Officer Dailey, the two individuals were not free to leave. PHT. 
13. Another officer arrived. PHT. 3. 
Officer Dailey testified that after he told Appellant and 
the other man that he thought they were involved in a drug 
transaction, "[t]heir response was that both of them said that I 
could search them." PHT. 3.2 Officer Dailey believed 
Appellant's response gave him permission to search Appellant's 
person. PHT. 14. Officer Dailey searched Appellant and found 
marijuana in his shoe. PHT. 4. Appellant was then placed under 
arrest. PHT. 5. The other officer turned over Appellant's bike 
to check if it was stolen, and some white powder spilled out of a 
2
 The officers "field carded" the other man and let him 
go. Officer Dailey apparently did not know his name. PHT. 5. 
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container located in a white plastic sack hanging from the 
handlebars of Appellant's bike. PHT. 5. A field test revealed 
the white substance to be cocaine. PHT. 6. 
On September 21, 1994, Appellant made a motion to 
suppress the drug evidence based on a violation of his rights to 
be free from an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The trial court judge ruled 
that the officers' detention was a "level II" detention and 
therefore required that Officer Dailey have a reasonable 
articulable suspicion to justify the detention. R. 78-80. The 
judge found there to be reasonable suspicion based on the 
following circumstances: 
He [Officer Dailey] saw these two individuals. 
While this was in a high drug trafficking area, 
he saw Mr. Rodriguez on a bicycle, sort of not 
peddling but moving his bicycle along with his 
feet toward the other individual. And the other 
individual is dressed in what appeared to the 
officer to be something like a tennis outfit, 
shorts and a Polo kind of shirt. And that he saw 
this individual take out of his pocket a wad of 
money, what appeared to him to be money. 
R. 80.3 See Addendum C for transcript of trial judge's oral 
findings. 
3
 These Findings of Fact were taken from the transcript 
of the proceeding on the motion to suppress of September 21, 
1994. No written Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law were 
prepared and made a part of the record, even though the court 
requested that the State prepare such Findings and Conclusions. 
R. 87. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly concluded that a level two 
detention occurred in this case where the officer told Appellant 
to stop and Appellant thereafter was not free to leave. The 
trial court incorrectly concluded that the officer had a 
reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant where the officer 
acknowledged that he simply had a hunch that a drug transaction 
had occurred. Any alleged consent to search flowed directly from 
the illegal detention and was the result of police exploitation 
of that illegality. The illegal detention was not attenuated 
from any alleged consent. Furthermore, the State did not argue 
below that consent vitiated the Fourth Amendment violation in 
this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE WHICH WAS SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
An individual has the right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.4 "No right is held more sacred, 
or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right 
of every individual to the possession and control of his own 
person, free from all restraint or interference of others unless 
by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Union 
Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
7 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States 
Supreme Court carved a limited exception to the probable cause to 
arrest requirement under the Fourth Amendment. Pursuant to 
Terry, a limited investigatory stop is permissible when the 
officer observes unusual conduct which leads to a "reasonable 
suspicion" that criminal activity may be afoot. Id. at 30. 
However, the officer must be able to point to specific and 
articulable facts justifying the detention. Id. at 21. A brief 
detention of an individual is justified when the officers "have a 
reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the 
individual is involved in criminal activity." Brown v. Texas, 
443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); see Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 498 
(1983) . 
The "reasonable suspicion" standard is codified in Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995). See also State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 
85, 88 (Utah App. 1987). The statute provides: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to 
believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public 
offense and may demand his name, address and an 
explanation of his actions. 
Under this statute, a police officer may make an investigatory 
stop of an individual after the officer has formed a reasonable 
suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is 
4
 Appellant has a similar right under Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Appellant does not, 
however, make a distinct argument under the Utah Constitution in 
this case. 
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engaged in or about to engage in or has engaged in criminal 
activity. State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 675 (Utah 1986); see Brown 
v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 51. The officer must be able to articulate 
what it is about the observed objective facts that give rise to 
an inference of criminal activity. Otherwise, the officer has 
only a hunch which will not justify a stop. State v. Menke, 787 
P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 1990). For the facts to be objectively 
reasonable, the court must ask, "would the facts available to the 
officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man 
of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was 
appropriate?" Terry v. Ohio, 399 U.S. at 21-22. Courts consider 
the totality of the circumstances in determining whether an 
officer had a reasonable suspicion to justify a stop. See State 
v. Potter, 863 P.2d 40, 43 (Utah App. 1993) ("There is no bright 
line test for determining if reasonable suspicion to stop exists. 
Rather, courts must look to the totality of the circumstances."); 
State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13 (Utah App. 1991) (court looks to the 
totality of the circumstances in determining whether reasonable 
suspicion existed to make an investigatory stop). 
A. THE TRIAL JUDGE CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
OFFICERS MADE A "LEVEL II" DETENTION OF 
APPELLANT. 
Not all police citizen encounters require a reasonable 
suspicion. In State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) 
(per curiam) (quoting United States v. Merrett, 736 F.2d 223, 230 
(5th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 496 U.S. 142, 106 S.Ct. 2250 
9 
(1986)), the Utah Supreme Court recognized three levels of police 
citizen encounters: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime 
[sic] and pose questions so long as the citizen 
is not detained against his will; (2) an officer 
may seize a person if the officer has an 
"articulable suspicion" that the person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime; however, 
the "detention must be temporary and last no 
longer than is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a 
suspect if the officer has probable cause to 
believe an offense has been committed or is being 
committed. 
In State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 985-87 (Utah App. 1994), 
this Court discussed the distinction between level one encounters 
and level two detentions. This Court stated in part: 
A level one stop "is a voluntary encounter 
where a citizen may respond to an officer's 
inquiries but is free to leave at any time." 
State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah App. 
1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991); 
accord State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 463 (Utah 
App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 
1992). "[A] seizure within the meaning of the 
fourth amendment does not occur when a police 
officer merely approaches an individual on the 
street and questions him, if the person is 
willing to listen." State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 
85, 87-88 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Florida v. 
Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 
75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)). Such consensual, 
voluntary discussions between citizens and police 
officers are not seizures subject to Fourth 
Amendment protection. Jackson, 805 P.2d at 768. 
In contrast, a level two stop, or a seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 
occurs when the officer "'by means of physical 
force or show of authority has in some way 
restrained the liberty'" of a person. United 
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552, 100 
S.Ct. 1870, 1876, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (quoting 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 
1868, 1899 n. 16, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); accord 
Truiillo, 73 9 P.2d at 87. "When a reasonable 
10 
person, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of 
cooperation with the officer's investigation, but 
because he believes he is not free to leave a 
seizure occurs." Truiillo, 739 P.2d at 87. "The 
test for when the seizure occurred is objective 
and depends on when the person reasonably feels 
detained, not on when the police officer thinks 
the person is no longer free to leave." State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991); accord 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877; 
Jackson, 805 P.2d at 767. 
This court has recognized circumstances 
that, when considered in light of all other 
circumstances, tend to indicate a seizure has 
occurred: "'the threatening presence of several 
officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, 
physical touching of the person of the citizen, 
or the use of language or tone of voice 
indicating that compliance with the officer's 
request might be compelled.'" Truiillo, 739 P.2d 
at 87 (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 
S.Ct. at 1877) . 
Bean, 869 P.2d at 986. In Bean, this Court held that "the trial 
court was correct in concluding the initial encounter . . . 
qualifies as a level one stop." This Court based its 
determination in part on the fact that only one officer was 
present and the officer "used no lights or sirens, and did not 
call out to defendant or tell him he must stay." Bean, 869 P.2d 
at 987 (emphasis added); see also State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 
881 (Utah App. 1989) ("level one" or "voluntary" encounters are 
police citizen encounters in which citizens "are free to leave 
any time they wish"). 
In the present case, the trial jude correctly ruled that 
Officer Dailey's detention of Appellant was a "level two" stop 
which required that the officer have a reasonable articulable 
suspicion to justify the detention. See Deitman, 739 P.2d at 
11 
617-18. The officer initially ordered Appellant to stop. 
PHT. 3. As the trial judge noted, the officer then told the two 
that he thought they were involved in a drug transaction and that 
they were waiting for another officer to arrive. R. 79; PHT. 3, 
11. Indeed, Officer Dailey acknowledged that Appellant and the 
other man were not free to leave at that point. PHT. 13. 
Pursuant to Smith, Deitman and Bean, this encounter where the 
officer told Appellant to stop, then told Appellant that they 
were waiting for a backup officer to arrive, and Appellant was 
not free to leave involved a "level two" encounter, requiring a 
reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the detention. 
Unlike Bean, more than one officer was involved, and Officer 
Dailey called out to Appellant and ordered him to stop. The 
trial judge therefore correctly concluded that the officer must 
have a reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the detention. 
B. THE TRIAL JUDGE INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
THE OFFICER HAD A REASONABLE ARTICULABLE 
SUSPICION TO JUSTIFY THE DETENTION. 
The trial court found that Officer Dailey had a 
reasonable articulable suspicion justifying the detention of 
Appellant. R. 86. The court based its finding on the following: 
(1) Appellant was in a high drug trafficking area, (2) Appellant 
was straddling a bicycle and moving it along with his feet toward 
another individual with whom Appellant spoke briefly, (3) the 
other individual was dressed in something akin to a tennis 
outfit, and (4) the other individual took what appeared to be a 
12 
wad of money out of his pocket and then replaced it. R. 80, 85. 
As defense counsel argued in this case, the behavior 
witnessed by the officer was "wholly consistent with innocent 
conduct." R. 81. The officer did not know the relationship 
between the two men. The conduct occurred near the homeless 
shelter and could have involved panhandling or a number of other 
innocent actions. R. 81-82. Appellant made no effort to reach 
for the money and did nothing illegal. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, the conduct 
observed by Officer Dailey did not give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. The officer himself acknowledged 
that he only had a "hunch" when he approached Appellant. PHT. 
17. A "hunch" is not sufficient to justify a detention. See 
State v. Lovecrren, 829 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah App. 1992); Truiillo, 
73 9 P.2d at 88. Nor do the factors relied on by the trial court 
demonstrate that the officer had a reasonable suspicion. 
First, the fact that Appellant was in a high drug 
trafficking area is insignificant to a reasonable suspicion 
determination. In Truiillo, 739 P.2d at 89, this Court held that 
the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to detain the 
defendant where the initial stop was based on the lateness of the 
hour and the location was in a high crime area. In Brown v. 
Texas, the Court stated, "The fact that appellant was in a 
neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a 
basis for concluding that appellant himself was engaged in 
13 
criminal conduct." Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 52. In Gipson v. 
State, 537 So.2d 1080, 1081 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1989), the court 
stated that the flight of a defendant from an approaching 
officer, even in a high crime area, does not give rise to 
reasonable suspicion to justify a stop. See also Johnson v. 
State, 610 So.2d 581, 583 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1992) (a drug 
suspect's attempt to conceal something in a known high crime area 
was not enough to justify an investigatory stop). 
In the present case, Appellant had every reason to be in 
this so-called "high drug traffic area." The homeless shelter is 
nearby as are a park and restaurants. The fact that drug 
trafficking occurs in this area does not suspend the Fourth 
Amendment protections. Indeed, given the fact that many homeless 
people are in this area because of the shelter and park, officers 
and courts should take care to assure that the Fourth Amendment 
protections are given full force in this area and that officers 
are not given free rein to "shake down" these individuals. 
Second, the fact that Appellant was straddling a bicycle 
and moving it along by his feet towards the other individual is 
irrelevant to a reasonable suspicion determination. Such conduct 
is not unlawful and is in no way consistent with any type of 
illegal activity. See Truiillo, 739 P.2d at 89. In fact, it is 
proper for a person riding a bike to place his feet on the ground 
and straddle the bike when approaching another individual with 
whom the person is going to speak. Officer Dailey testified at 
the preliminary hearing that Appellant was not in violation of 
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any law. PHT. 14. 
Nor does the fact that the other person was dressed 
differently in something akin to a tennis outfit support a 
reasonable suspicion determination. PHT. 5; R. 80. Reasonable 
suspicion by an officer must go to the particular individual 
thought to be involved in criminal activity. United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 418 (1981). In State v. Potter, 863 
P.2d 40, 43 (Utah App. 1993), this Court stated that the officer 
must be able to point to unlawful or suspicious behavior which 
connects the detainee to the suspected criminal activity. In 
this case, the other individual, not Appellant, was the person 
who the officer thought was out of place. Therefore, the other 
individual's manner of dress should not be considered in 
determining whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion to 
detain Appellant. Additionally, persons who dress differently or 
are from different socioeconomic or racial groups can converse 
briefly with each other without raising a suspicion that criminal 
activity is afoot. 
The fact that Appellant was briefly speaking with an 
individual who had a green wad which looked like money (PHT. 10) 
also does not raise a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity 
was afoot. In State v. Potter, 863 P.2d 40 (Utah App. 1993), 
this Court stated that the police officer "must be able to 
articulate some unlawful or suspicious behavior connecting the 
detainee to the suspected criminal activity." Id. at 43. In the 
present case, Appellant did not reach for or possess the item 
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which looked like a wad of money to the officer. The other 
individual is the person who withdrew the wad from his pocket, 
then replaced it. Furthermore, many innocent explanations exist 
for reaching into one's pocket and removing what appears to be 
money. 
Various courts have held that where officers see two 
people converse but do not see an actual exchange of money, the 
officers do not have a reasonable suspicion to justify a 
detention. In State v. Ellington, 495 N.W.2d 915 (Neb. 1993), 
the court held that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion 
of drug-related activity. The stop was based upon the fact that 
the individual was leaning into a parked car in a high crime 
area. When the officer approached, the individual walked away. 
The court stated that the officer would have needed to have more 
articulable facts, such as an exchange of money or an object 
between the two, the defendant placing something in his pocket, a 
recent tip as to the illegality, or the observation of other 
similar encounters by the defendant in the area, in order to make 
the stop permissible. In the present case, none of the above 
factors were present. Appellant never possessed the wad of money 
(PHT. 11-2), Officer Dailey was not responding to a recent tip of 
drug activity in that area (PHT. 7), nor had Officer Dailey 
observed other similar activity by Appellant (PHT. 11). 
In Gipson v. State, 537 So.2d 1080 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 
1989), the court stated that the mere suspicion of criminal 
activity is not enough to justify a stop. Even though the 
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officers were in a high crime area, observed the defendant 
engaging in what appeared to be a drug transaction, and the 
defendant fled from the officers when they approached, there was 
not a reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant. The officers 
had never observed an exchange of drugs or money or suspected the 
defendant in another crime. 
The facts in Brown v. Texas, where the United States 
Supreme Court held that the officer did not have a reasonable 
suspicion, are similar to the facts in the present case. In 
Brown v. Texas, the officer observed two men walking away from 
each other in an area with a high incidence of drug trafficking. 
The officer "believed the two were together or about to meet" 
when the police car appeared. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 48. 
The officer detained the defendant but not the other individual. 
In concluding that the detention violated the Fourth Amendment, 
the Court stated: 
The flaw in the state's case is that none of 
the circumstances preceding the officers' 
detention of appellant justified a reasonable 
suspicion that he was involved in criminal 
conduct. [The officer] testified . . . that the 
situation in the alley "looked suspicious," but 
he was unable to point to any facts supporting 
that conclusion. [footnote omitted]. There is 
no indication in the record that it was unusual 
for people to be in the alley. The fact that 
appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by 
drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for 
concluding that appellant himself was engaged in 
criminal conduct. In short, the appellant's 
activity was no different from the activity of 
other pedestrians in that neighborhood. 
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 52. 
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Under the totality of the circumstances of this case, the 
detention of Appellant violated the Fourth Amendment; the fruit 
of that illegal detention should have been suppressed. 
C. THE ALLEGED CONSENT DOES NOT VITIATE THE 
ILLEGAL DETENTION. 
Officer Dailey testified that when he told Appellant and 
the other individual that he thought a drug transaction was 
occurring, the "response" of both men was that the officer could 
search them. PHT. 3. No other testimony was taken regarding a 
consent to search by Appellant. Appellant argued that any 
"consent flow[ed] directly from the illegal detention" and that 
there was no attenuation between the illegality and the alleged 
consent to search. R. 64-5. 
The State did not argue that consent vitiated the prior 
illegality. Instead, the State took the position that the stop 
involved a level one, consensual encounter. Nor did the trial 
judge address the consent issue or rely on consent as a basis for 
upholding the stop. In addition, a review of the evidence 
demonstrates that Appellant did not validly consent to a search 
under the two-prong test articulated in State v. Thurman, 846 
P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), and State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 
1990) . 
"[A] defendant's consent to a search following illegal 
police activity is valid under the Fourth Amendment only if both 
of the following tests are met: (i) The consent was given 
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voluntarily, and (ii) the consent was not obtained by police 
exploitation of the prior illegality." State v. Thurman, 846 
P.2d at 1262 (citing State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688). 
A determination of whether the consent was obtained by 
police exploitation of the prior illegality is synonymous with a 
determination of "whether the 'taint' of the Fourth Amendment 
violation was sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of 
the evidence." Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263 (quoting New York v. 
Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19 (1990) (citing United States v. Crews, 
445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980))). The purpose for suppressing tainted 
evidence "is that the Fourth Amendment should not permit law 
enforcement to "ratify their own illegal conduct by merely 
obtaining a consent after the illegality has occurred." Thurman, 
846 P.2d at 1262 (quoting Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 689). The 
prosecution has the burden in the trial court of establishing 
that police did not exploit the initial illegality. Thurman, 846 
P.2d at 1263. 
In Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263, the Utah Supreme Court 
emphasized that "the exploitation analysis 'always should be 
conducted with the deterrent purpose of the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule sharply in focus . . . .'" Id. (citing Brown 
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975)). In conducting the 
exploitation analysis, courts consider (1) "the purpose and 
flagrancy" of the misconduct, (2) the "'temporal proximity'" of 
the illegality and the consent," and (3) "the presence of 
intervening circumstances." Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263 (quoting 
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Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 691 n. 4 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 
at 603-04)). 
In considering the "purpose and flagrancy" factor, courts 
consider whether there was a "'purpose in engaging in the 
misconduct" and whether the misconduct was flagrantly abusive or 
otherwise a "pretext for collateral objectives." Thurman, 846 
P.2d at 12 64. The Thurman court recognized that misconduct aimed 
at obtaining consent will almost always require suppression of 
the evidence. Id. Indeed, the court stated that "if the purpose 
of the misconduct was to achieve the consent, suppression of the 
resulting evidence clearly will have a deterrent effect and 
further analysis rarely will be required." Id. 
In the present case, the initial illegal detention 
appears to be intentional. The officer acknowledged that he 
merely had a "hunch." Case law establishes that a "hunch" does 
not create the constitutionally required reasonable suspicion. 
The officer made the initial detention in order to ultimately 
search Appellant. Implicit in the officer's hunch that Appellant 
was trying to sell drugs was a hunch that Appellant had drugs in 
his possession. The illegal detention in this case was made with 
the purpose of obtaining consent or some other means to search 
Appellant and pursue the officer's hunch. The State did not bear 
its burden in the trial court of establishing that the initial 
illegal detention was made for any purpose other than to obtain 
consent to search. The purpose and flagrancy factor therefore 
weighs heavily in favor of suppression. 
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Unlike the situation in Thurman, the purpose of the 
illegal detention in this case appears to have been an attempt to 
facilitate a search for drugs. The officer did not evidence any 
safety concern and he was not acting under a valid warrant, as 
was the case in Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1274. 
The alleged consent was made immediately after the 
officer informed Appellant of the detention. The illegality and 
the alleged consent were therefore very close in time. No 
intervening circumstances separated the illegality from the 
consent. 
The situation in this case contrasts with that in Thurman 
where five hours had passed since the illegal entry and "the 
frenzy of the illegal entry and subsequent search had abated and 
Thurman had been advised of his Miranda right for a second time." 
Thurman at 1274. In this case, Appellant was not mirandized 
prior to the alleged consent. No time passed and no intervening 
circumstances occurred. Under these circumstances, the taint of 
the illegal detention was not attenuated and the officer 
exploited the illegality. There is a tremendous deterrent value 
to suppressing this evidence given the circumstances of this 
case. Furthermore, the potential for abuse would be great if 
this Court were to uphold the admission of evidence based on a 
consent theory in circumstances such as this. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
his conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this 3AX day of August, 1995. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
MARK ft. MOFFAT/ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
77-7-15 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
burden to show reasonable and probable cause 
for believing items offered for sale had been 
unlawfully taken by the detained or arrested 
person; this section in essence codifies the pre-
existing common law defense of probable cause 
to effect an arrest and expands it to incorporate 
specific private persons in the shoplifting con-
text. Terry v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 605 
P.2d 314 (Utah 1979). 
Evidence of prior conviction. 
Where customer sued merchant for malicious 
prosecution, false arrest and false imprison-
ment arising from alleged shoplifting incident 
and introduced evidence the incident left her 
severely depressed and suicidal, merchant 
which wished to introduce evidence of a prior 
shoplifting conviction and its surrounding facts 
as affecting the issue of damages was properly 
restricted to showing fact of the prior act and 
the identity of the party involved in view of, 
inter alia, the similarity of the incidents and 
substantial likelihood of confusing the jury. 
Terry v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 
314 (Utah 1979). 
Liability. 
—Acquittal. 
Store that had probable cause to detain sus-
pected shoplifter's sister was not liable for false 
arrest even though sister was subsequently 
acquitted of shoplifting charge. Davis v. Zions 
Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 29 Utah 2d 336, 509 
P.2d 362 (1973). 
Motive for arrest. 
Section offered no civil immunity to a mer-
chant who initiated a customer's arrest for 
purpose of effecting a civil remedy to collect 
money owed, even if the money was lawfully 
owed; thus section did not shield auto dealer 
from liability for false imprisonment where 
customer drove away in new truck after leaving 
check for less than purchase price dealer was 
demanding and dealer called police and asked 
that truck be picked up, saying there had been 
a theft. Greenwell v. Canyon Lincoln Mercury, 
Inc., 575 P.2d 688 (Utah 1978). 
Probable cause. 
—Specific cases. 
There was sufficient evidence upon which to 
base a jury verdict denying damages for false 
arrest, where plaintiff, an eighteen-year-old 
motorcycle rider, had placed a small article of 
merchandise in his helmet, justifying a reason-
able suspicion that he was shoplifting. Fuller v. 
Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036 (Utah 
1975). 
—Standard. 
The standard applicable to detentions and 
arrests by merchants is composed of both sub-
jective and objective elements; the merchant 
must allege and prove not only that he believed 
in good faith that his conduct was lawful, but 
also that his belief was reasonable; even if the 
crime was not in fact being committed or at-
tempted, if the merchant in good faith believes 
that such facts are present as to lead him to an 
honest conclusion that a crime is being commit-
ted by the person to be arrested then he may 
not be held liable for false arrest. In determin-
ing the reasonableness of the conclusion, the 
test to be applied is one that is practical under 
the circumstances, i.e., whether a reasonable 
and prudent man in his position would be 
justified in believing facts which would warrant 
making the arrest. Terry v. Zions Co-op. Mer-
cantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 32 Am. Jur. 2d False Impris-
onment §§ 44 et seq., 66. 
C.J.S. — 35 C.J.S. False Imprisonment 
§§ 14, 21 to 25, 40(4) to (7). 
AX.R. — Defamation: actionability of accu-
sation or imputation of shoplifting, 29 A.L.R.3d 
961. 
Admissibility of defendant's rules or instruc-
tions for dealing with shoplifters in action for 
false imprisonment or malicious prosecution, 
31 A.L.R.3d 705. 
Construction and effect in false imprison-
ment action of statute providing for detention 
of suspected shoplifters, 47 A.L.R.3d 998. 
Changing the price tags by patron in self-
service store as criminal offense, 60 A.L.R.3d 
1293. 
Key Numbers. — False Imprisonment «=> 2, 
10, 13, 15. 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question 
suspect — Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing 
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ARREST, BY WHOM, AND HOW MADE 77-7-15 
or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address 
and an explanation of his actions. 
History: C. 1953, 77-7-15, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Alcohol use by minor. 
Avoiding roadblock. 
Basis of suspicion. 
Court's findings. 
Drug use. 
No reasonable suspicion. 
Out-of-state licenses. 
Prostitution. 
Revoked license. 
Standard. 
Suspected shoplifting. 
Vehicles. 
Cited. 
Alcohol use by minor. 
Defendant's young appearance and the smell 
of alcohol on defendant's breath gave police 
officer a reasonable articulable suspicion, based 
on objective evidence, that the defendant had 
consumed alcohol and was a minor. State v. 
Bean, 869 R2d 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Avoiding roadblock. 
Avoiding a roadblock, even assuming its le-
gality, without more, does not create an 
articulable suspicion that the occupants have 
engaged in or are about to engage in criminal 
activity. The act merely demonstrates a desire 
to avoid police confrontation, and at best only 
gives rise to a hunch that criminal activity may 
be afoot. State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
Basis of suspicion. 
The reasonable, articulable suspicion con-
templated in this section must be based on 
objective facts suggesting that the individual 
may be involved in criminal activity. State v. 
Menke, 787 P.2d 537 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In order to conclude that there was reason-
able suspicion to justify stopping defendant, an 
officer must be able to articulate some unlawful 
or suspicious behavior connecting the detainee 
to the suspected criminal activity. State v. Pot-
ter, 863 P.2d 40 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
When a reliable source with reasonable sus-
picion based on articulable facts reports the 
commission of a crime and, based on the re-
layed facts, the dispatcher communicates the 
information to the police, and the responding 
officer's own observations corroborate the dis-
patch, reasonable suspicion exists for a stop. 
State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
Court's findings. 
Trial court erred in ruling that a city police 
officer had a reasonable suspicion to justify 
seizing defendant, who was seen emerging from 
a 24-hour grocery store at 3:30 a.m., where the 
court made only a conclusory finding that de-
fendant's answers to questions regarding the 
ownership of a vehicle in the store parking lot 
were "inconsistent, vague and suspicious." 
State v. Munsen, 821 R2d 13 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
Drug use. 
When an officer saw defendant smoking a 
cigarette, which from her training and experi-
ence she recognized as a marijuana "joint," 
while the defendant was in a vacant parking lot 
in his vehicle with the windows rolled up on a 
warm day, even though the defendant's activity 
was conceivably consistent with innocent activ-
ity, it was strongly indicative of criminal activ-
ity and the officer had reasonable grounds to 
stop the vehicle and investigate further. Provo 
City Corp. v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). 
No reasonable suspicion. 
Where suspects were detained on the basis of 
a description by a fellow officer who had seen 
them walking in the vicinity of a burglary, and 
where the suspects were not observed at the 
scene of the crime, or engaging in unlawful or 
suspicious activity, the "reasonable suspicion" 
test was not met. State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 
718 (Utah 1985). 
Detention of defendant on a city street at 
3:30 a.m. was unreasonable where the initial 
decision to stop was based merely on the late-
ness of the hour and the high-crime factor in 
the area, and defendant's "nervous" conduct 
was consistent with innocent as well as with 
criminal behavior. State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Seizure of defendant's automobile was in-
valid, where his initial stop for driving in the 
left lane had been used as a pretext to support 
the arresting officer's "hunch" that defendant 
was engaged in illegal activity. State v. Sierra, 
754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
No reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
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Art. I, § 14 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and 
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirma-
tion, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing 
to be seized. 
History: Const. 1896. Liquor, search, seizure and forfeiture, 
Cross-References. — Controlled Sub- § 32A-13-103. 
stances Act, search warrants, § 58-37-10. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
In general. 
Administrative inspections and searches. 
Automobile search. 
—Inventory. 
Blood samples. 
City ordinance. 
Consent to search. 
—Who may consent. 
Drugs. 
Evidence voluntarily surrendered. 
Exclusionary rule. 
Hair samples. 
Information used to support warrant. 
Invalid search warrant. 
Inventory search. 
Juveniles. 
Liquor. 
Neutral and detached magistrate. 
Particular description. 
Plain view. 
Private searches. 
Probable cause. 
—Veracity of witness. 
Reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Scope of search. 
Search. 
Search incident to arrest. 
Search warrant. 
—Validity. 
Search without warrant. 
—Delay before search. 
—Propriety. 
Standing to object to search. 
—Stolen vehicle. 
Stopping for criminal investigation. 
Cited. 
In general. 
Neither under a subpoena duces tecum nor 
under a motion to examine will an examina-
tion be permitted of a nature to contravene 
provision against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. Evans v. Evans, 98 Utah 189, 98 P.2d 
703 (1940). 
It is generally recognized that the legitimate 
use of a search warrant is restricted to public 
prosecutions, and in no event may such pro-
ceeding be invoked for the protection of a mere 
private right. Allen v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36, 
110 P.2d 355 (1941). 
It is use to which it is put that renders prop-
erty, otherwise lawful and rightful to have, use 
and possess, subject to seizure and forfeiture. 
Hemenway & Moser Co. v. Funk, 100 Utah 72, 
106 P.2d 779 (1940). 
For general discussion of fourth amendment 
to federal Constitution, see City of Price v. 
Jaynes, 113 Utah 89, 191 P.2d 606 (1948). 
Whether a search and seizure is reasonable 
is to be determined by the trial court, and evi-
dence in plain view of the officer pursuing a 
felon may be rightfully seized and such seizure 
is not a violation of the federal constitutional 
protection as set forth in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 
(1961). State v. Allred, 16 Utah 41, 395 P.2d 
535 (1964). 
No illegal search and seizure occurred where 
police went to defendant's apartment pursuant 
to a tip, were voluntarily admitted by another 
defendant, saw articles taken in burglary in 
plain sight on kitchen table and were shown 
other stolen merchandise willingly by defen-
dant. State v. Kaae, 30 Utah 2d 73, 513 P.2d 
435 (1973). 
Where, although investigation was in its 
preliminary stages, police officers realized 
there was a possibility that defendant had com-
mitted rape and homicide that they were inves-
tigating, and feared that he might try to escape 
or obtain a weapon if he got out of their sight; 
their conduct in accompanying him into his 
bedroom while he finished dressing and in ob-
serving shirt with long strands of hair resem-
bling that of the victim which shirt and hair 
were in plain sight, did not constitute an un-
reasonable search and seizure, nor was taking 
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AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED 
STATES 
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS] 
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVI 
AMENDMENT I 
[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT III 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the 
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by 
law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
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ADDENDUM B 
or O 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
STATE OTCTAH MAY 2 5 1995 
RICHARD RODRIGUEZ 
By -rf'/ryotTKltf^jfi 
CHARGE: Possession of a Controlled Substance 3° 
CASE #: 941011948FS 
PROSECUTOR: Vincent Meister 
DEFENSE: Mark R. Moffat TRAMSCili P~T OF 
JUDGE: Sheila K. McCleve Tuoce&WAf*-s 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE INVOKED. f J 
SWEARING IN OF WITNESSES. Di^r^f Court Case. 
FORMAL READING OF THE INFORMATION WAIVED. # Sz//^, acr 
DIRECT EXAMINATION Court c+ Appals 
Q. Please state your name and spell your last name for the 
record. 
A. It's Kenneth Dailey, D-A-I-L-E-Y. 
Q. What's your occupation? 
A. A police officer with Salt Lake City Police. 
Q. Are you a certified category one police officer? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long have you been with the Salt Lake City Police 
Department? 
A. I've been with them four years with eight years in law 
enforcement. 
Q. A total of eight years? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who before Salt Lake City Police? 
A. The University of Utah. 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Q. Does that training include the detection and apprehension of 
00114 I.P-
FILED 
MAY 2 6 1995 
persons involved in drug issues? 
A. Yes. I also worked a year of undercover narcotics. So, yes, 
I've had a lot of training. 
Q. Can you tell me about your training and experience involving 
drugs? 
A. I've had several classes through POST, and also been to 
different seminars and stuff the year I worked narcotics in Las 
Vegas. I wouldn't know the total hours. 
Q. Let's take your attention to July 27, 1994, at 150 South 500 
West, approximately 6:53 p.m. Were you on duty at that time at 
that location? 
A. Yes. 
Q. To your knowledge, is that location in Salt Lake County? 
A. It is. 
Q. What were you doing at that time at that location? 
A. I was in an area that is well known for drug trafficking. I 
work on the motorcycle squad and we were asked to go and check out 
the Pioneer Park area. 
Q. Were you in uniform at that time? 
A. I was. 
Q. Were you on your motorcycles? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that a marked motorcycle? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you observe at that time at that location? 
A. I observed two males approach each other. One had pulled some 
2 
00115 
money out of his pocket. 
Q. Did you actually see money? 
A. Yes. It was in a wad in his hand. 
Q. How far were you from that individual when you saw that? 
A. Well, I got as close as maybe 25 feet before he actually put 
it back in. 
Q. Then what. 
A. They started to separate and I asked them.... I got off and 
detained them both and asked them to wait for another officer to 
come. 
Q. Were you riding alone? 
A. I was. 
Q. What happened then? 
A. Another officer pulled up shortly and was talking to both of 
them. I explained to them what I observed and what I felt could be 
going on. 
Q. What did you tell them. 
A. I told them that we were having a terrible problem with drug 
activity in the area and that I felt there was a drug transaction 
going on and that we were waiting for another officer to arrive. 
Q. What did they say when you told them that? 
A. There response was that both of them said that I could search 
them. 
Q. What did you do? 
A. At that point, the officer was getting out of his car and so 
I waited for him and we searched. 
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Q. What officer? 
A. Officer Wolrich. 
Q. And, huh, you're saying that they said that you could search 
them? 
A. Yes, 
Q. Did you ask to search them? 
A. No. Urn, they just blurted out the statement from both of 
them. 
Q. And so you did search them? 
A. Yea, meantime for the one came back with some warrants too. 
Q. Which individual, do you recall? 
A. The defendant, uh the gentleman sitting at the defense table. 
Q. The two individuals that you observed, would you recognize 
them if they were in court today? One or both? 
A. Huh, one for sure. 
Q. Is that person in court today? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you point him out and describe what he is wearing? 
A. The gentleman at the defense tale in the gray jumpsuit. 
Q. Your honor, may the record reflect the identification. 
Judge M: Yes. 
Q. You searched the individuals. Did you find anything? 
A. Yes, there's urn, in the defendant's shoe there was a bag of 
marijuana. 
Q. In what shoe? Do you recall? 
A. I don't recall exactly what shoe without reading the report 
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but it was in, actually under the liner of the shoe that he was 
wearing. At that point, he was under arrest for both the warrant 
and that. Urn, Officer Wolrich turned the bike over to check to see 
if that was stolen. 
Q. How far were you from Officer Wolrich when this was going on? 
A. Just a couple feet. 
Q. Where was the other person with the money at this time? 
A. He had been released on just like a field card information 
cause there was nothing that we felt we did have anything on him. 
Q. O.K., Can you describe that individual? 
A. He was white male, mid-thirties. He was dressed different 
from the usual person we're seeing in that area. 
Q. Describe him. 
A. He was dressed in urn like new clothes, huh, shorts looked like 
he was going to play tennis. He had like a golf shirt, new shoes, 
tennis shoes, urn.. 
Q. That person was released. What did you do with the defendant? 
A. He was placed under arrest for the warrant and also for having 
marijuana. 
Q. Tell me about the bicycle. 
A. The bicycle that I had actually seen him on and riding, there 
was a white plastic sack, like your Smiths' garbage or grocery 
sack, urn, on bicycle tied to the handle bars. And when the officer 
turned it over, some white powder and item came out of the bag that 
was on the bag. 
Q. What did you do with that? 
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A: Well they, the one, the powder that was on the ground, just 
cleaned up that and then there was a container, like I said it was 
a paper that we grabbed that still had some of the light powder in 
it* And we field tested that. 
Q: What did you field test it with? 
A; A cocaine test kit. 
Q: How do you know huh, that the field test kit was ok? 
A: It was indicted. All the vials was intact, everything was 
indicted and hadn't been used. 
Q: Can these kits be used twice? 
A: No. 
Q: Ok and what was the results of that test? 
A: It was positive for huh, cocaine. 
Q: Alright. And what did you do after that? 
A: We had, Officer Wolrich and I huh, I took the evidence and 
placed it in police evidence and we transported the individual to 
jail. 
Q: Did you have conversation with the defendant huh, regarding 
what it was that you found in the plastic sack? 
A: Yes, huh, well there was also some spontaneous comments that 
were made too. 
Q: Can you tell me about those? 
A: The individual, he said that the marijuana was his, and he 
smokes marijuana something to the effect huh, cause that's a 
misdemeanor and the cocaine is a felony. So that wasn't his. He 
claimed that the cocaine didn't come out of the bag. You know. 
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Q: Where did he claim it came from? 
A: From Officer Wolrich. 
Q: No further questions• 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
MM: You have been with the Salt Lake City Police Department for 4 
years. Is that correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And on this particular day you were on motorcycle patrol? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Were you part of any huh, detail assigned to Pioneer Park area? 
A: Yes, that day I believe huh, about once a week we're assigned 
to go down there. 
Q: And who assigns you there. 
A: Just our Sargent, its kind of an informal type assignment. 
Q: And you were assigned there on that particular day? 
A: Urn huh, for that .. 
Q: By your Sargent? 
A: Yes. 
Q: With what orders? 
A: Its just a verbal informal, instead of going out and responding 
to calls, they want us to go down and do that. Not respond to 
calls. 
Q: Go down and do what? 
A: Check just the area for the problems that have been going on. 
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From everything from traffic problems to drug problems to DDT 
problems but the difference is that we just don't respond to calls• 
Q: So you go down there and just investigate if there's any •• 
A: Just anything that happens* 
Q: Is that part of the zero tolerance policy that the police 
department have enforce at this time? 
A: I've never heard it stated that way, other than just by other 
officers. 
Q: What have your heard? 
A: What's that? 
Q: The other officers refer to it as that? 
A: Like our Captain has said that you know, we don't want kind of 
a zero tolerance. Not exactly those words but they want to take 
care or clean up the area. 
Q: And your detail on that particular day was part of this clean 
up effort? Is that whats your testimony? 
A: In an informal way. 
Q: You say that this area is known for drug trafficking? This is 
an area down around the Shelter, is it not? 
A: Yes. 
Q: You have been given intelligence reports about the activity in 
the area, I take it? 
A: Several times, yeah. 
Q: Now, you were on your motorcycle, and that's a marked unit? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you were wearing a uniform? 
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A: Yes. 
Q: This takes place at about 6:00 at night? 
A: I wouldn't know the exact time but yeah it was probably around 
there* 
Q: It was still light out? 
A: Yes. 
Q: You were traveling which direction on your motorcycle? 
A: Urn, I would have been coming from 2nd South, so Northbound. 
Q: Northbound on which street? 
A: 500 West. 
Q: You see two men on the sidewalk. Where are they, which side of 
the sidewalk? 
A: Urn, there's only one in that area and that's on the West side. 
Q: The West side of 5th West? 
A: Of 5th West yes. 
Q: How far away from them were you when you first noticed them? 
A:. I noticed them when I turned the corner .. 
Q: How far away is that? 
A: You know its maybe half a block. 
Q: They were facing which direction? First of all, Mr. Rodriguez? 
Which direction is he facing? 
A: Right now? 
Q: When you first saw him. 
A: They were facing away from me. They were facing each other. 
They weren't looking my direction at that point. 
2: Mr. Rodriguez was on a bicycle? 
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A: Yes. 
Q: His back was to you? 
A: He just wasn't looking my direction. It could have been the 
side or what. 
Q: The other gentleman was .. 
A: They were facing each other. 
Q: Yes, and what I'm trying to get from you is that Mr. Rodriguez 
was facing which way? The other gentleman was facing which way? 
I can understand them facing one another, which? 
A: I know. I believe that Mr. Rodriquez was facing in an 
Northeast direction, the other gentleman would have been a 
Southwest. That's what I can recall. 
Q: What businesses are in that area? 
A: I couldn't tell you. There's a bar, there's a car lot type 
place and I think the one is a moving storage type place. 
Q: The two gentleman are, seem to be talking to one another? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you say you saw the one gentleman pull something out of his 
pocket, isn't that correct? 
A: Urn huh. 
Q: And you were how far away when you saw that? 
A: Well as I got close to them I could see that and like I say, 
when I finally realized that I felt it was money, huh.. 
Q: You felt it was money? 
A: I could see that it was green. It was like a wad and it looked 
like money, yes. 
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Q: You have no idea of the relationship between the two men on the 
side of the sidewalk when you first saw them? 
A: When I first saw them, no. 
Q: And the gentleman that seemed out of place to you huh, had his 
hands in his pockets? 
A: No, like I said he had his hand out of his pocket. 
Q: Did you ever see his hand in his pocket? 
A: Yeah, and he pulled the green wad out of his pocket. 
Q: They noticed you and walked away? Is that correct? 
A: They attempted, like I said, I was fairly close at that point 
and I asked them to stop which they did. 
Q: Ok, let me ask you another thing, you asked them to stop, they 
would include Mr. Rodriguez and the other gentleman? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Mr. Rodriguez had nothing at that point which was in violation 
of the law, is that correct? 
A:- No. 
Q: That's a no? 
A: No. 
Q: You didn't see Mr. Rodriguez break the law at that point did 
you? 
A: Not at that point, no. 
Q: And all you saw this other individual do was pull something 
that you thought was money out of his pocket? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: And Mr. Rodriguez made no effort to get that money from him did 
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he? 
A; No. 
Q: He simply sat there on his bicycle. 
A: No. Well huh, there were approaching each other like they were 
getting closer• 
Q: So Mr. Rodriguez is riding down the street on this bicycle and 
the other man is walking? 
A: He was straddling his bicycle with his feet on the ground. 
Q: Moving the bicycle along the sidewalk? 
A: Towards the .. 
Q: And the other gentleman is walking down the sidewalk as well 
towards Mr. Rodriguez. 
A: No, they weren't that far apart at all. Urn, they were just 
approaching each other and like I say, he was straddling his 
bicycle and maybe just walked a few steps towards the gentleman. 
Q: At that time Mr. Rodriguez was not free to leave is that 
correct? 
A: No. 
Q: You told it while (inaudible) . They started to separate, 
correct? 
A: Yeah. 
They attempted to move away from you, isn't that right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: You told them to stop? 
A: I asked them to, yes. 
Q: At that point in time, they were not free to leave? 
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A: Z explained why. 
Q: My question is that they were not free to leave at that point? 
Isn't that right? 
A: No. 
Q: It's not right? 
A: I just answered that were not free to leave, no. 
Q: Ok. Ok. And you at that point in time indicated to them that 
you were having problems in the area with drugs and that you felt 
that there was a drug transaction going on? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And prior to that point in time, you had not mirandized either 
individual, is that correct? 
A: That's correct". 
Q: Mr. Rodriguez c e r t a i n l y was not mirandized? 
A: No. 
Q: So you made these statements to them about what you were doing 
and they responded? 
A: Yes. 
Q: The other person seemed out of place, is that right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you let him go, is that correct? 
A: Yes. After the investigation. 
Q: You let him go because you had nothing to hold him on, isn't 
that right? 
A: After we did like huh, record checks and stuff like that. 
Q: How long did that take? 
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A: Just a few minutes. 
Q: He never indicated that he was there to buy cocaine? 
A: He did. 
Q: Where is that in your report? 
A: Umf I just remember informally talking to him and I asked him. 
I don't know if that is in my report, I just .. 
Q: It's an important fact isn't it? 
A: What's that? 
Q: That is an important fact isn't it? 
A: Sure. I don't know if it is but I can recall it right now the 
gentleman's .. He told me that he was there to do that but that 
hadn't even taken place. He was there to purchase drugs but that 
didn't take place. 
Q: Yet you let him go? 
A: Cause we did have anything on him. He" had no warrants. All we 
had on him was .• 
Q:- You had probable cause to believe that he was attempting to 
purchase drugs, isn't that correct? 
A: No because they were still a couple feet away. I didn't feel, 
I didn't have any drugs on him, all I had on him was money. 
^•Q: So you didn't feel he was in any way in violation of the law 
himself? 
^ A : NO. Other than suspicious. 
Q: Mr. Rodriguez gave permission to search his person, isn't that 
correct? 
A: Yes. 
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Q: He never gave you permission to search his bicycle. 
A: That's correct* 
Q: Nov, you indicated in your report that the substance that fell 
out of the white bag had spilled out, isn't that correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Isn't it true that the substance was on the sidewalJc prior to 
the time that you confronted Mr. Rodriguez? 
A: No. That's not true. 
Q: Never fotind any substance spilled out in the plastic bag that 
was on Mr. Rodriguez's bicycle, did you? 
A: What's that? 
Q: Substance, there was no cocaine spilled out inside the white 
plastic bag on the handle bars was there? 
A: Urn, I'm not sure I understand how your saying that. There was 
an item that came out of that with the substance. Coming out of 
it. 
Q: And the substance was coming out of this item? 
A: Yes. 
Q: But none of the sxibstance was inside, the item didn't spill 
inside the plastic bag did it? 
A: No. 
Q: It didn't recover any cocaine from the plastic bag itself. 
A: No. 
Q: You at no point in time mirandized Mr. Rodriguez, did you? 
A: I didn't question him. 
Q: The question is you never mirandized him did you? 
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A: No. 
Q: This individual, did you take note of his name? 
A: A field card by the other officer. 
Q: Do you know what his name was? 
A: I couldn't tell you. 
Q: You say he was a white male? 
A: Yes. 
Q: In his mid-thirties? 
A: Approximately. 
Q: Had shorts on? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And a golf shirt? 
A: Yes. 
Q: By his own admission, he was attempting to purchase cocaine? 
A: I recall him saying drugs. 
Q: Describe the item that fell out of the plastic bag? 
A:- It looked to me like a crumbled up paper ball. 
Q: Alright, at the time that you saw the two men, at the time that 
you saw them on the sidewalk together, you didn't hear any 
conversation between them? 
A: No. 
Q: I just want to make sure that I understand what Mr. Rodriguez 
was doing. The other man was pulling something from his pocket, 
Mr. Rodriguez was on his bicycle? 
A: And they were close to each other. 
Q: Close to each other. And Mr. Rodriguez at no time made any 
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gestxxre with his hands to take whatever the person was pulling out 
of his pocket? 
A: No. 
Q: At the time that you saw the two men, you had no idea what they 
were doing? 
A: Urn, well huh, I don't know how to answer that question. 
Q: You had a hunch that something was going on? 
A: Yes. 
Q: That's all your honor. 
FE piRgcr 
VM: Just a couple of questions your honor. 
Judge M: Go ahead. 
Q: Officer, did you search the defendant before the bike was 
searched? 
A:- Yes. 
Q: Was the marijuana found before the bike was searched? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Ok. And when you approached these two individuals, could you 
tell if they were communicating with each other? 
A: It looked like they were. Like I said, they were really close 
to each other. 
Q: How were they communicating with each other? 
\: Looked like talking. 
2: Did you notice any eye contact? 
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A: Yes. They were l ook ing a t each other. 
Q: Any p h y s i c a l g e s t u r e s bes ides ta lking? 
A: Other than moving you know, towards each o t h e r , no t h a t I 
r e c a l l • 
Q: But you didn't hear what it was that they were saying? 
A: No. 
Q: Ok. Mo further questions your honor. 
RE CROSS 
MM: The individual that indicated he was there to purchase drugs, 
didn't say which drugs he was there to purchase, is that correct? 
A: I don't recall that, no. 
Q: The substance that was tested to be cocaine was found in a 
piece of paper rolled up? 
A:- Like a ball, yes. 
Q: Like a ball? Was it in a type of plastic twist? 
A: No, it was in that balled paper. There was leaf, what it was, 
there was the paper and then a leaf on that and then the white 
substance and then that was rolled up. And it partially opened when 
it fell out. 
Q: So it easily spilled out then? 
A: Urn huh. 
Q: The leaf? It is an actual leaf, a drawing of a leaf, what is 
it? 
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A. I didn't open it up anymore than it was opened; just sealed it 
after the test. But, it looked like me to just a normal, like a 
maple leaf-type thing. 
Q. When Mr. Rodriguez was initially detained by you, you say that 
he indicated that you could go ahead and search him, isn't that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't do that immediately, did you? 
A. It was relatively short after that because I explained to him 
that I was going to wait for my safety. I was waiting for the 
other officer to arrive. 
Q. During that period of time he wasn't free to leave. 
A. No. It was a real short period of time and there was allot of 
officers in that area. The officer pulled' up just momentarily. 
Q. So, you detained him initially for something, you had a hunch 
that this was some type of drug transaction, isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And Mr. Rodriguez and the other individual are detained and 
you tell them why you are there, isn't that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then you wait for backup. 
A. Yes. 
Q. You did nothing in that period of time to verify anything that 
was going on, isn't that correct? 
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A. I didn't open it up anymore than it was opened; just sealed it 
after the test. But, it looked like me to just a normal, like a 
maple leaf-type thing. 
Q. When Mr. Rodriguez was initially detained by you, you say that 
he indicated that you could go ahead and search him, isn't that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't do that immediately, did you? 
A. It was relatively short after that because I explained to him 
that I was going to wait for my safety. I was waiting for the 
other officer to arrive. 
Q. During that period of time he wasn't free to leave. 
A* No. It was a real short period of time and there was allot of 
officers in that area. The officer pulled up just momentarily. 
Q. So, you detained him initially for something, you had a hunch 
that this was some type of drug transaction, isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And Mr. Rodriguez and the other individual are detained and 
you tell them why you are there, isn't that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then you wait for backup. 
A. Yes. 
Q. You did nothing in that period of time to verify anything that 
was going on, isn't that correct? 
A. I said, I explained why I was there and the officer arrived 
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like simultaneously. It was a real short period. 
Q. Mr. Rodriguez indicated to you, at that point in time, that he 
wasn't doing anything improper, isn't that correct? 
A. The only thing he said to me was that I could go ahead and 
search him. 
Q. Meaning to you that he didn't feel that there was anything to 
hide, isn't that correct? 
A. Um, that's probably what he thought. I wouldn't entertain 
what he was thinking, I don't know. 
Q. That's how you interpret it, though, isn't that correct? 
A. I didn't interpret it, but that's just what he said. 
Moffat: Nothing further, your Honor. 
Judge: You may step down. 
Pros: That's the States only witness, your honor, for the 
purposes of this hearing there is a stipulation as far as the tox 
report; and if I may read that. "Cocaine was identified in the 
plastic bag. The total weight of the sample was 1.8 grams. The 
plastic bag was found to contain 4.0 grams of crushed marijuana. 
Kevin L. Smith, Criminalist. " 
Judge: Mr. Moffat? 
Moffat: Your honor, we will be calling no witnesses. Richard, 
you have the right to testify today but my advice to you is that 
you not testify. Will you follow my advice? 
Richard: I will follow your advice. 
Moffat: We will submit it, your honor. 
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ADDENDUM C 
1 arrive• 
2 MQ What did they say when you told them that? 
3 MA Their response was that both of them said 
4 that I could search them." 
5 So the way I first read it, and as I read it 
6 again, it does look as though he actually informed the 
7 defendant and this other individual that when he approached 
8 them that he felt there was a drug transaction going on. And 
9 in light of also the dialogue that he was going to call for 
10 backup, it seems to the Court that the weight of the evidence 
11 is that this was not a Level I search — or a stop, rather. 
12 That this was a Level II stop. 
13 Now, the question was, is there a reasonable 
14 articulable suspicion as to whether these individuals were 
15 about to commit a crime or were in the process of committing 
16 a crime? And the evidence as to that is, first of all, this 
17 is an experienced officer with a year in narcotics 
18 enforcement. He saw these two individuals. While this was 
19 in a high drug trafficking area, he saw Mr. Rodriguez on a 
20 bicycle, sort of not peddling but moving his bicycle along 
21 with his feet toward the other individual. And the other 
22 individual is dressed in what appeared to the officer to be 
23 something like a tennis outfit, shorts and a Polo kind of 
24 shirt. And that he saw this individual take out of his 
25 pocket a wad of money, what appeared to him to be money. 
0C080 
1 Now, obviously if the officer had seen 
2 Mr. Rodriguez produce something from him in exchange for this 
3 money, I think it could be fairly said the witness witnessed 
4 what appeared to be a completed drug transaction and there 
5 would be very little or no question about the officer's right 
6 to stop. On the other hand, it would be just as clear on the 
7 other side of the scale if the officer saw these two 
8 individuals on the street have a brief encounter, no wad of 
9 money and move on, even though it's in a high trafficking 
10 area, that would be wholly consistent with lawful activity. 
11 What this case turns on is whether looking at the 
12 totality of the circumstances the officer had a reasonable 
13 articulable suspicion. 
14 Mr. Moffat, I need to ask you, is it your position 
15 that the officer himself has to bring all these elements 
16 together, or can the officer testify to what he observed and 
17 then have that presented in the form of argument to the 
18 Court? You seem to be suggesting that the officer has to do 
19 some kind of running commentary on, Well, in my training 
20 this, and, In my training that. Is that what you feel is 
21 necessary? 
22 MR. MOFFAT: I would, your Honor, especially in a 
23 situation such as this where we have behavior that is wholly 
24 consistent with innocent conduct taking place in front of the 
25 officer's eyes. And I needn't remind the Court this is in an 
00081 
